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ABSTRACT 
Privacy-preserving document exchange among collaboration 
groups in an enterprise as well as across enterprises requires 
techniques for sharing and search of access-controlled information 
through largely untrusted servers. In these settings search systems 
need to provide confidentiality guarantees for shared information 
while offering IR properties comparable to the ordinary search 
engines. Top-k is a standard IR technique which enables fast 
query execution on very large indexes and makes systems highly 
scalable. However, indexing access-controlled information for 
top-k retrieval is a challenging task due to the sensitivity of the 
term statistics used for ranking.  
In this paper we present Zerber+R – a ranking model which 
allows for privacy-preserving top-k retrieval from an outsourced 
inverted index. We propose a relevance score transformation 
function which makes relevance scores of different terms 
indistinguishable, such that even if stored on an untrusted server 
they do not reveal information about the indexed data. 
Experiments on two real-world data sets show that Zerber+R 
makes economical usage of bandwidth and offers retrieval 
properties comparable with an ordinary inverted index. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The number of access-controlled documents shared over 
enterprise intranets is growing rapidly. Collaboration groups 
within or across enterprises require facilities for effective and 
efficient retrieval of the top-k documents most relevant to a given 
query while shielding those documents from others’ eyes. In the 
enterprise settings users can participate in a number of 
collaboration groups and need to obtain the most relevant top-k 
results from the whole document collection accessible to them.  
Top-k is a standard IR technique which enables fast query 
execution on very large indexes and makes systems highly 
scalable. It prevents information overload by returning only 
highly ranked documents most relevant to the user query and 
allows reducing bandwidth in case group members use mobile 
devices to access the enterprise’s search facilities.  
Whereas top-k retrieval of publicly available documents is well-
studied, indexing access-controlled information for top-k 
processing remains a challenging task. Even within a single 
enterprise (even more so with respect to collaborations within 
virtual enterprises), competitive working groups are not likely to 
agree on a single trusted server hosting the index or fully trusted 
system administrators. Therefore an index created over a set of 
confidential documents requires specific protection.  
Inverted indexes are the standard choice for keyword (full-text) 
top-k document search. An inverted index is a sequence of 
posting lists, each of which contains the posting elements 
(elements for short). Every posting element represents a document 
which contains a particular term and includes the relevance score 
used for ranking (e.g., the term frequency). Posting elements 
within the list are sorted with respect to their scores which allows 
for efficient determination of the top-k results by pruning lower 
scored posting elements. Figure 1 shows an inverted index with 
two posting lists.  
 
 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, an inverted index, which is a highly efficient data 
structure for top-k retrieval, does not preserve confidentiality of 
the indexed documents. The content of a document can be easily 
uncovered by a straightforward posting lists scan. Relevance 
scores within the posting elements disclose the number of the 
indexed documents highly relevant to a specific term. Even if the 
exact content of the elements is obscured, the number of highly 
ranked documents can give an industrial spy important insights, 
e.g., identification of compounds used in the development of a 
new chemical process [6].  
In general there is a tradeoff between retrieval effectiveness of the 
index and confidentiality it can provide. On the one hand in order 
to effectively answer a query, an index server requires possibly 
complete ranking information enclosed in its posting elements. On 
the other hand this information gives undesirable insights into the 
content of the indexed documents. 
In this paper we present Zerber+R, a novel ranking model 
which allows for top-k retrieval from a confidential outsourced 
inverted index without information leakage. This paper makes the 
following contributions: (i) we introduce the problem of the 
confidential top-k retrieval from an outsourced inverted index; (ii) 
we propose Zerber+R, a ranking model which minimizes 
information leakage by top-k retrieval from a confidential 
outsourced inverted index by supporting sorted indexes which do 
not exhibit additional information to a potential adversary  (iii) we 
propose a novel relevance score transformation function, RSTF 
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Figure 1: Inverted Index 
for short, – a heuristic which hides term specific distribution of 
relevance score values, making scores of different terms 
indistinguishable. This heuristic enables inclusion of 
(transformed) relevance scores in the posting elements on an 
untrusted server to allow the server answering top-k queries; (iv) 
we demonstrate retrieval effectiveness and efficiency of the index 
on two real-world data sets. 
2. SCENARIO 
PCC (Production Control Company) creates adoptive solutions 
for production process controlling in manufactures. These 
solutions include special soft and hardware which is adapted 
according to the needs of every specific customer. A lot of 
electronic documents such as project and scientific 
documentation, stuff management, e-mail correspondence, 
presentations, collaborative documents and others have to be 
shared among the partners in the specific projects of PCC.  
John is a leader of several projects within PCC. Each project 
corresponds to a customer manufacture. In order to always obtain 
up-to-date documents for his projects and share appropriate 
information with team members of a specific project, John 
requires a privacy-preserving centralized sharing and search 
facility. Because of the very sensitive nature of shared data, the 
advisory board of PCC decides to use Zerber as the indexing 
system. Zerber supports selectively sharing of access-controlled 
documents and delivers precise search results and at the same time 
preserves the r-confidentiality of the shared data.  
As John has access to a huge number of documents, he is not 
interested in obtaining all the documents containing query terms, 
but rather a few documents most relevant to the query. An 
ordinary search engine can pre-select such documents using 
relevance score values attached to each posting element. 
However, these scores are calculated based on sensitive statistical 
information such as e.g. term frequency. A term frequency 
distribution is sufficient to characterize the subject matter of a 
lengthy document, and the likely content of a short email, giving 
adversary insights in the content of the indexed documents. To 
avoid this problem Zerber stores encrypted relevance values in the 
posting elements and returns references to all the documents 
matching a query, such that only an authorized user can decrypt 
and rank posting elements on the client side. 
Due to the nature of his job John has to travel a lot and uses 
Zerber search interface with help of a PDA and GPRS internet 
connection. As this kind of connection is very slow the data 
volume transmitted over it needs to be minimized. To reduce data 
transfer the server needs some means to identify the best 
documents that match John’s query and return only the best top-k 
search results. 
In the following, we show how to construct a server-side index 
which supports top-k retrieval while preserving the given 
confidentiality guarantees.  
3. BACKGROUND 
In the literature different ways of protecting outsourced 
information were proposed. While several approaches considered 
protecting outsourced data by encryption [9], [12], encryption of 
posting elements in an inverted index does not hide document 
frequency (the number of documents containing specific term), 
which can be used by an adversary to reverse-engineer the terms 
[6]. Probabilistic-based index protection techniques suppress 
statistical data introducing a controlled amount of uncertainty by 
including false positive elements in the index [2]. This technique 
represents a tradeoff between search efficiency and confidentiality 
preservation. While it ensures a certain degree of confidentiality, 
result quality suffers due to the intentional index incorrectness. 
Zerber [22] protects an inverted index by combining the benefits 
of both, probabilistic and encryption techniques. It allows 
obtaining precise search results from an outsourced encrypted 
index while providing confidentiality guarantees for the indexed 
documents. Zerber introduces the concept of r-confidentiality as a 
measure of the information degree that can leak from an index (cf. 
Section 2.1).  
In order to avoid information leakage if an index server is 
compromised and to provide tunable resistance to statistical 
attacks Zerber supplements encryption of posting elements with a 
novel probabilistic term merging scheme. This scheme selectively 
combines posting lists representing different terms into one 
posting list (as shown in Figure 2) until a certain probabilistic 
threshold is met. Posting lists are merged such that the probability 
of a particular term being related to a concrete posting element 
does not exceed a certain value r. The system allows for tunable 
index confidentiality/efficiency and does not affect the IR 
effectiveness of the inverted index.  
 
 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, none of the existing index protection approaches 
supports server-side top-k retrieval, which is essential for retrieval 
efficiency and economical usage of network resources, as the user 
is typically not interested in all available search results, but only 
in the most relevant ones. μ-Serv [2] does not support centralized 
ranking at all; Zerber randomly distributes posting elements 
containing encrypted ranking information within the merged 
posting list, which only allows performing top-k on the client side 
after the querying client downloads the whole posting list.  
3.1 r-Confidentiality 
The concept of r-confidentiality was introduced in [22]. 
r-confidentiality is a measure of the degree of information that can 
leak from an index about access-restricted documents, given an 
adversary’s background knowledge of the document corpus or 
general language statistics. r-confidentiality bounds the ability of 
an adversary to make probabilistic claims about the contents of a 
document collection. Assume a scenario where an adversary Alice 
tries to reconstruct collection content from an r-confidential 
index. From her background knowledge B and the parts of the 
index structure I that she can access, Alice will know a-priori that 
a term t is contained in document d with a probability ( )dtP Î . For 
example, for a set of emails, B should include ( ) 1"" =Î dSubjectP , 
for all d and I. The probability estimate P(X|B) about fact X that 
Alice can make based on B can not be controlled, but her ability 
to refine that estimate when she computes P(X|I,B) can be limited. 
In the following, only facts X of the form “term t is in document 
d” and “term t is not in document d” will be considered. 
List1 2.doc#and#5 1.txt#imClone#2 1.txt#and#3 
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Figure 2: Merged Unencrypted Posting Lists 
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Here, r is the factor of maximal probability amplification for term 
t in d given I. The indexing scheme offers maximal protection 
when P(X|B) = P(X|I,B), i.e. I does not provide any additional 
knowledge about X. 
Zerber [22] is an r-confidential global inverted index for sensitive 
documents. Zerber relies on a centralized set of largely untrusted 
index servers that hold encrypted posting list elements. To 
provide tunable resistance to statistical attacks, Zerber employs a 
novel term merging scheme. In this scheme posting lists are 
selectively merged together (as shown in Figure 2), such that the 
probability of a particular term being related to a concrete posting 
element does not exceed r times the probability of the term in the 
document corpus. The probability pt of occurrence of a term t in 
the document corpus D is represented by its normalized document 
frequency. The posting elements are placed randomly inside the 
merged posting list and therefore their positions do not reveal any 
additional information to the adversary. 
Definition 2: a merged posting list is r-confidential iff the term 
probability amplification inside of the merged posting list does 
not exceed r. That is, a merging scheme is r-confidential iff 
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where pt is the probability of occurrence of the term t in the 
document corpus D, S is the set of terms in a merged posting list 
and r is the confidentiality parameter. Note that in order to 
preserve the r-confidentiality property the posting elements 
representing different terms are randomly distributed within the 
merged posting list, to resist statistical attacks. 
Zerber stores ranking information as well as term and document 
identifiers within each posting element in an encrypted form. As 
ranking information is not accessible to the server, Zerber does 
not support server-side ranking. As posting lists are not sorted, the 
complete lists need to be retrieved by the querying client to obtain 
the top-k results. 
3.2 Relevance Score Calculation 
In order to allow for efficient top-k retrieval and to support index 
updates in a collaborative environment, relevance score needs to 
be included in each posting element in a way the index server can 
access. In this section we provide a definition for scoring 
function, and discuss its factors relevant to confidential ranking.  
Powerful top-k server-side ranking techniques were introduced in 
the literature [18]. The Vector Space Model is the most widely 
used model in IR for determining document relevance within a 
collection. In this model, a document d is represented as a vector, 
where each term is assigned a specific weight indicating the 
importance of the term in representing the semantics of the 
document. Two factors are of importance in the weight 
assignment: the normalized term frequency, which is the number 
of term occurrences in the document divided by the document 
length, and the inverse document frequency (IDF) which 
represents the query term selectivity. At the query time the 
relevance score (rscore hereafter) of a document d for a query Q is 
computed using one of the standard techniques. As an example 
the computation using TFxIDF technique is performed as follows: 
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where: TFq   is  the number of occurrences of the query term q in 
d, |d|  is the document length measured in terms and nd(t) is the 
number of documents containing term t. 
The term frequency based weighting factor is responsible for the 
correct ordering of documents with respect to a single query term. 
Normalization applied to the term frequency in Equation 3 
prevents longer documents from being highly ranked just because 
of their length. IDF is responsible for making relevance scores of 
different terms comparable in case of multi-term queries. 
Unfortunately, IDF calculation requires knowledge of collection 
statistics, such as total number of documents as well as the 
number of documents containing particular query term. As the 
global index contains posting elements with different access 
rights, revealing such global IDF in the relevance score leaks 
critical statistical data about inaccessible documents [6].  
Thefore, in Zerber+R we focus on confidential top-k query 
processing for single-term queries. In this case IDF factor is 
constant and relevance score calculation can be calculated as: 
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Results of a single-term query can be accurately ranked based 
only on the information contained in a single document using 
Equation 4. Processing of multi-term queries can then be 
performed by executing a number of single-term queries. By this 
procedure, the retrieval accuracy of a multi-term query slightly 
decreases representing a tradeoff between confidentiality of the 
collection statistics and retrieval accuracy of the index [21]. 
Inclusion of collection-wide statistics such as IDF is a topic for 
future work. 
3.3 Outsourcing Relevance Scores 
A naïve approach to provide confidential ranking in an outsourced 
index would be to arrange posting elements in the posting list on 
the client side before outsourcing them. For instance, an inserting 
client could ensure that the most relevant top-k posting elements 
are contained in the head of the posting list. However, this 
approach is not suitable for the collaboration groups’ scenario, as 
the index contains posting elements with different access rights 
and therefore cannot be rearranged by a single user. Moreover, the 
whole process would need to be repeated whenever the document 
collection changes, rendering it impractical in case of frequent 
index updates. 
To allow for top-k retrieval in an ordinary inverted index, 
relevance scores of posting elements are made available to the 
server. However, the scores increase the amount of information 
available to the server and thus decrease confidentiality provided 
by the outsourced inverted index, like it will be shown in the 
section 3.4.  
Scoring information is typically term specific and can allow 
adversary to reverse-engineer the terms.  
In case of probabilistic-based index protection (e.g. [2]) an index 
contains a controlled amount of false positive elements. Adding 
relevance scores to the posting elements in this case would require 
generation of the realistic relevance scores for the false positive 
elements to prevent statistical attacks. 
Sorting posting elements by their relevance score in a Zerber’s 
merged posting list (Figure 3) may amplify the probability of a 
particular posting element to be related to a specific term, 
violating the r-confidentiality guarantees provided by the index. In 
the worst case it may allow an adversary to overcome the merging 
i.e. to find out which of the merged terms corresponds to a 
particular posting element.  Consider a merged posting list 
containing terms “and” and “imClone”. By sorting posting 
elements according to their term frequency, “extended version” 
would more probably appear in the tail of the list, as its term 
frequency is lower for all (or nearly all) documents.  
 
 
3.4 TF Distribution 
Confidential document ranking is a challenging task. On the one 
hand, encrypting relevance scores to protect them on an untrusted 
index server does not allow the server to perform any ranking. On 
the other hand, if accessible to the index server, the term 
frequency information required for the computation of relevance 
scores is term specific, and therefore can reveal the actual term in 
an index even if the term itself is encrypted, hence breaking 
confidentiality guarantees provided by the index.  
Term frequency distribution among the documents in a collection 
follows a power law distribution (as shown by a log-log plot). 
Figure 4 shows the term frequency distributions for the frequent 
term (in German language) “nicht” and the less frequent term 
“management” in the test collection described in Section 5.1.1.  
 
Figure 4: Log-Log Plot of TF Distributions 
Terms can be differentiated by slope and value range of their TF 
distribution. State-of-the–art IR techniques mostly use term 
frequency normalized by document length [18] in order to avoid 
that large documents are ranked higher simply because they 
contain more terms. 
 
Figure 5: Log-Log Plot of Normalized TF Distributions 
Normalized TF represents the frequency fraction of a term in a 
document, which depends on the document topic, assigning 
higher ranks to the specific terms. Normalized TF distributions, as 
extracted from our study on our test collections (Figure 5 
illustrates an example for the aforementioned terms), are not 
power law but still term specific. An attacker knowing these 
typical term distribution patterns could derive the indexed terms 
from the TF distribution found in the inverted index. 
Since most state-of-the–art IR techniques use normalized TF for 
ranking [18] our aim is to store the relevance scores accessible to 
the untrusted server while hiding the term specificity of the 
normalized TF distribution, therefore making posting elements 
representing different terms indistinguishable in a merged posting 
list. At the same time we need to preserve the relevance order of 
posting elements in a merged list to allow for top-k retrieval.  
4. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
We target the problem of providing confidential top-k retrieval 
from an outsourced inverted index. In the ideal case the server can 
order posting elements regarding to their relevance without 
violating the confidentiality of the index. 
In an r-confidential index the probability of a particular element in 
the posting list of being related to a specific term is r-bounded. A 
scoring function will order the terms according to their relevance 
and may increase the probability of a specific term being within 
particular positions or intervals of the posting list, given the 
adversary has knowledge of specific TF distribution as well as the 
public scoring function.  
The ideal indexing scheme restricts an adversary’s ability to 
increase her available knowledge, even if she takes over an index 
server and can examine the ranking information of posting 
elements and the stream of incoming queries and updates. 
Assuming posting elements contain relevance scores and they are 
accessible by the index server, then the elements can be ordered 
(sorted) by the server in order to retrieve top-k results for a given 
query. In the following, we refer to a merged index whose posting 
elements contain relevance score values as an ordered index. An 
ordered posting list is a merged posting list in an ordered index. 
The ordered index offers maximal protection in case relevance 
score values does not reveal any additional knowledge about the 
index content.The ideal ordered index will be unattainable in 
practice, but we can identify the factors which have impact on the 
confidentiality of an ordered index and quantify the degree of 
their impact. 
4.1 Threat Model 
To execute a keyword query, the user first authenticates herself to 
an index server and supplies the query terms to the server as well 
as k - the desired number of the top-k documents. The index 
server determines user’s access rights, identifies posting list 
containing query terms and returns the highest ranked elements 
from the requested list.  
In order to enable the server to identify the top-k elements 
relevance scores of each posting element must be visible to the 
index server. This additional knowledge can compromise 
confidentiality of the index. Specifically, we want to bound the 
ability of an adversary to perform the following attacks: 
1) Identify terms represented by the posting elements by 
analyzing relevance score values stored in the index. 
Posting List ID Posting Elements 
List1 2.doc#and#5 1.txt#and#3 1.txt#imClone#2 
Figure 3: Merged Posting Lists sorted by Term Frequency 
An adversary Alice could use relevance score distribution 
statistics to extract specific features like score ranges, or score 
distribution patterns for each particular term. Alice could compare 
extracted features with the relevance score distribution in the 
posting lists to find correlations. If the terms are encrypted Alice 
could use these statistics to break the encryption. In a merged 
index, in case a simple term frequency based scoring function is 
used, she could claim that “frequent terms are more probably 
located in the head of the merged posting list” and even undo the 
posting list merging. 
2) Determine query terms of other users by observing 
queries and query results. 
In case of a merged ordered posting list, the number of requests 
required for obtaining top-k elements for a rare or a frequent term 
may differ. Alice can also know the k-value which is requested by 
the client application. As document frequency is term specific, 
Alice could guess the term by observing the number of follow-up 
requests required to fill the top-k results.  
To guard against these attacks Zerber+R proposes novel 
techniques making relevance scores and number of follow-up 
requests for different terms indistinguishable for the server while 
preserving retrieval accuracy of server-side top-k processing. 
4.2 Confidentiality preservation by relevance 
score transformation 
Server side top-k processing requires the server to access 
relevance scores of each posting element. However, as explained 
before, the distribution of posting elements within a merged 
posting list according to their plain relevance scores can reveal the 
corresponding term of the posting element (as shown on Figure 
3). Since the scoring function presented in Equation 4 is 
monotonic, it is possible to make transformations to such function 
without affecting the ranking process as long as the ordering 
within posting elements representing each particular term is 
preserved. This section introduces the requirements for building a 
relevance score transformation function (RSTF hereafter), which 
makes relevance score distributions of different terms 
indistinguishable. Specifically, it uniformly distributes posting 
elements representing different terms within the merged posting 
list while the order of posting elements related to each single term 
remains unaffected. This transformation function assigns a 
transformed relevance score (TRS for short) to each posting 
element, therefore replacing the original relevance score. To 
preserve confidentiality of the index a posting element related to 
any term t in an ordered posting list should have equal probability 
to obtain a given TRS score. 
 RSTF has to fulfil the following properties: 
· RSTF maps the relevance scores of different terms to a 
range R, which will be the same for all RSTFs.  
· RSTF uniformly distributes the TRS values over R. 
· RSTF preserves the order of the relevance score values. 
In the next section we propose a heuristic for the construction a 
RSTF for arbitrary term independent of its score distribution.  
5. Zerber+R  Design 
Processing in Zerber+R can be split in two phases: an offline 
pre-computing phase performed once at the time of index 
initialization and an online insertion and query phase. In the pre-
computing phase, Zerber+R initializes and publishes the RSTF 
for each term in the training document set, such that in the online 
insertion phase this function can be used by an inserting client. To 
index a document, its owner extracts the document’s terms, builds 
their elements, encrypts them, calculates TRS values, and sends 
encrypted posting elements to the server along with the IDs of the 
merged posting list that the new element belongs to, the 
document’s group and the TRS value. The index server 
authenticates the user, checks his group membership and accepts 
the update if appropriate. Finally, the server inserts posting 
elements into the specified merged posting list. Upon query the 
server has access to the TRS values and can identify the top-k 
most relevant query answers.  
5.1 RSTF Construction 
We define the target RSTF range to map the relevance score input 
values (calculated using Equation 4) as R=[a1, a2].  
In order to explain our approach, we first consider the case where 
the input values are already uniformly distributed over some range 
[b1, b2]. In this case RSTF is a straight line with slope (b1-b2)/(a1-
a2) and offset -b1, and is a projection of [b1,b2] on R.  
For example Figure 6 shows, how f(x) = 2.5*x-1.25 maps a range 
[0.5, 0.9] to [0, 1]. The slope of the projection function is 
responsible for the scale of the input range in the output range. 
Given an input range, the greater the slope of the projection 
function, the wider is the output range. Unfortunately, the 
relevance score distribution in the document set is not uniform 
and a linear projection does not change the distribution of the 
input relevance score values. To uniformly distribute the input 
values over the output range, the slope of the RSTF at each 
particular point has to reflect the probability density of the 
relevance score values at this point, i.e. it should create a wider 
output range in the more crowded areas. Thus the probability 
density function of the relevance score values is a derivative of the 
RSTF and respectively the RSTF is an integral over the 
probability density function of the relevance score values. 
 
 
Figure 6: Relevance Score Transformation: Linear Projection 
 
The values of the integral over a probability density function are 
always contained within the common range [0, 1]. Moreover, an 
integral is monotonically increasing, which preserves the ordering 
of the input values. Thus an RSTF created in this way would 
possess the first and third required properties discussed above. 
In the following we model the probability density of the relevance 
score distributions and compute a RSTF that approximates the 
relevance score distribution to a uniform distribution.  
5.1.1 Modelling Relevance Score Distribution 
To model the relevance score distribution, Zerber+R requires as 
input a training set of documents. This set must be a 
representative sample of the corpus, such that the distribution of 
the relevance scores will hold for the whole corpus as well. From 
the training set Zerber+R extracts the relevance scores for each 
term-document pair. Terms found later, which were not contained 
in the training set are assumed to be rare and can therefore be 
assigned a random TRS. We base our model on the central limit 
theorem [17] stating that the sampling distribution of the sample 
mean is approximately normal, even if the distribution of the 
population from which the sample is taken is not normal. 
We consider each relevance score value from the training set to be 
a sample mean of the relevance score. The continuous probability 
density function of the normal distribution is the Gaussian 
function. We model the probability distribution of the relevance 
score values around each sample mean as a Gaussian curve. We 
take the sum of the Gaussian curves over all samples as an 
approximation of the relevance score distribution for a given term 
over the whole document corpus. Thereby we make use of the fact 
that a probability density function can be arbitrarily closely 
approximated by a weighted sum of Gaussian curves [1]. 
A Gaussian function can be defined by two parameters, location 
and scale: the mean ("average", μ) and variance (standard 
deviation squared) σ 2, respectively. The probability density of a 
term t over the whole document corpus given N training points is 
calculated as: 
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(5) 
where  μi – is the ith value from the training set and σ  – is the 
scale of the Gaussian function. 
A more frequent term results in several training values. In this 
case the sum of the Gaussian bells, one for each input value, will 
reflect the probability distribution over the input interval. The 
probability of unseen values being in particular region is reflected 
through the density of training points in that region.  
 
Figure 7: Probability Distribution from 5 Training Values 
Figure 7 shows the sum of the probability density functions over 
five input values. The X-axis shows the relevance score of a 
training value. The Y-axis shows the probability density. Solid 
lines represent probability density of each training value. The 
dashed line represents the probability density accumulated using 
several training values.   
5.1.2 Calculating the RSTF 
RSTF(x) is an integral of the probability distribution of the input 
training values within the range [ ]x,-¥ . 
Given N training points RSTF(x) can be calculated as: 
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where x is a relevance score to be transformed, μi is the ith value 
from the training set, N is a number of the values in the training 
set and  σ  is the scale of the Gaussian function. 
Therefore, RSTF(x) represents a projection of the relevance score 
distribution that approximates the relevance score distribution into 
a uniform distribution over the range [0, 1]. An integral of the 
Gaussian function within the range [ ]x,-¥ can be estimated with 
the standard error function: 
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Thus the RSTF can be calculated as: 
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Figure 8: An Example RSTF for a Term 
Using training set from our data sets (see Section 7.1), Figure 8 
illustrates an example RSTF function for the German term 
“Vergütung” (reimbursement). The X-axis shows the input 
relevance score, the Y-axis illustrates its output TRS value 
computed using Equation 8.  
5.1.3 σ Selection 
In order to ensure the uniformness of the TRS distribution on the 
whole corpus it is needed to ensure the correct prediction of the 
relevance score distribution during the RSTF computation. 
Correctness of the prediction depends on the representativeness of 
the training set as well as on the correct σ selection.   
The σ parameter represents the scale of the Gaussian function  
reflecting the generality of the RSTF. σ is responsible for the 
learning/memorizing effect. Smaller σ means a broader Gaussian 
bell – and thus a more general prediction. Higher σ value means a 
narrower bell, meaning a less general function which represents 
the particular training point (also known as overfitting).   
To select an optimal σ value we use the cross-validation technique 
to measure the uniformness of the TRS distribution in a control 
set. As a basic measurement for uniformness we compute the 
variance in the distribution of the TRS values of a particular term 
in the control set with respect to a uniform distribution, that is, 
how far the TRS distribution is from a uniform distribution. 
Figure 9 presents the TRS variance in the control set dependent 
on the σ value. The X-axis shows the σ value, the Y-axis shows 
the variance within TRS values in the control set. At first, the 
TRS values are distributed more uniformly with an increasing σ. 
However, after reaching the minimum (an optimal σ), the 
overfitting effect appears and the uniformness is destroyed. An 
optimal σ for a particular term is the infimum of the variance 
function. As Figure 9 depicts, a good selection of σ provides a 
variance of smaller than 0.00002 (standard deviation of 0.0044, 
that is, 0.44% of the range [0, 1]). 
The process of cross-validation is time consuming. Finding a 
method for directly determining an optimal σ value is an 
interesting direction for future research.  
5.2 Query Answering using Zerber+R 
To execute a keyword query, the user first authenticates herself to 
an index server and tells the server which posting list she wants to 
query as well as the k-value. The index server determines user’s 
access rights and returns a number of highly ranked elements from 
the requested list. The client decrypts posting elements and filters 
out elements for terms not queried. If the client did not obtain the 
desired number of elements belonging to the queried term it sends 
a follow-up request to the server. Dependent on the response size, 
the number of follow-up requests for rare and frequent terms can 
differ, leaking information to the adversary. In the following we 
discuss heuristics reducing the number of follow-up requests.   
Suppose that all the posting lists are merged into M lists L1,…,LM. 
The total workload cost Q for a set of queries for retrieving the 
top-k elements can be calculated as:  
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where qj is the query frequency of term j, and N(Lj) is the number 
of elements to be retrieved from the merged posting list Li.  
Posting elements in each merged list are sorted based on their 
TRS. Following the uniform distribution, the first position pos1 of 
the term t in the list can be approximated as: 
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where pt is the probability of term t and nd(t) is the document 
frequency of the term t in a merged list L. In order to obtain the 
top-k elements of the term t the total number N of elements to be 
retrieved from the list L is:  
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where nd(t) is the document frequency of the term t in a merged 
list L. In order to retrieve the top-k elements from the merged list 
without knowing which particular term is queried, the number of 
retrieved elements should be sufficiently large to include the top-k 
elements for all merged terms in the posting list L.  
However, this is impractical in case a posting list contains very 
rare terms. For instance, for a list with terms for which nd(t)=1 
(term t is contained only in one document), the whole posting list 
will be returned in response to the query. Thus we need a heuristic 
to determine the query response size that reduces the total 
workload cost. This heuristic should minimize the used bandwidth 
while including the top-k answers in the first response to most of 
the received queries. 
From query load logs described in Section 7.1.3 we know that the 
most frequent queries constitute nearly the whole query workload 
(Figure 10). Thus to reduce the total workload cost, the query 
answering heuristic should provide high efficiency for the most 
frequent queries. Due to confidentiality concerns we can not use 
query frequency directly. However, document frequencies and 
query frequencies are correlated, though some frequent terms are 
rarely queried (e.g., “although”) [15]. To provide efficient query 
answering for the most frequent queries while reducing the 
bandwidth, Zerber+R puts a bound b on the initial response 
size, such that only sufficiently frequent terms with probability 
pt*b>=1 are necessarily returned within the first query response. 
We discuss the choice of the initial response size in Section 7.4. 
In case a rare term t with probability pt*b<1 is requested the user 
sending the query might need to issue several follow-up requests 
to obtain the top-k results. This can give an adversary the 
possibility to infer a rare term has been requested, therefore 
allowing her to distinguish between two merged terms in case one 
is frequent and the other rare. In order to prevent this situation, 
Zerber+R makes use of the BFM index (using the Breadth First 
Merging of posting lists) described in [22], which ensures that the 
terms merged in a posting list have similar frequency 
distributions. Therefore even if retrieving top-k results from a 
merged list containing rare terms could require a number of 
follow-up requests, this number will be similar for all terms 
contained in the list, avoiding that an adversary is able to infer any 
additional information. An adversary could also try to estimate the 
position of a queried term in the posting list based on the querying 
behaviour of the user. Zerber+R reduces the information 
leakage in this case by progressively increasing response size for 
follow-up requests. Assuming that the user can process at least the 
 
Figure 9: TRS Variance Depending on the Selected σ 
amount of data she already obtained Zerber+R doubles response 
size for each follow-up request until the user is satisfied with the 
result or obtains the whole list.    
6. EVALUATION 
Confidentiality guarantees provided by Zerber+R depend on the 
ability of the RSTF to uniformly distribute the relevance score 
values among the given range. We proposed an experimental 
measure to quantify the uniformness of the distribution.  
This section evaluates Zerber+R in terms of security guarantees, 
resource usage and efficiency in query answering. 
6.1 Experimental Setup  
For our experiments, we used two data sets: the first collection is 
extracted from the Stud IP Learning Management System [20], 
and the second consists of Open Directory Project crawl data [16]. 
For each of our document collections we created an index 
containing 32K merged posting lists. We use a web search engine 
query log as the workload. All experiments were performed on a 
2-processor 2.0 GHz Intel CPU T2500 with 2 GB RAM.  
6.1.1 Stud IP Data 
The Stud IP Learning Management System [20] allows sharing of 
access-controlled materials within groups of students and teachers 
and is used by several universities in Germany. The Stud IP 
installation we use for our experiments has over 3,300 courses 
and 6,000 registered students. A mid-semester snapshot used for 
our experiments contained 8,500 documents with 570,000 terms. 
6.1.2 Web Data 
We used a collection from the Open Directory Project [16] (a 
human edited directory of the Web) crawled in 2005, with 
237,000 documents and 987,700 distinct terms. The crawler's 
strategy was to find pages on a variety of topics [13], such that 
100 topics were randomly selected; we used the set of documents 
on one topic as the set of documents of one group. To obtain a 
representative sample for the RSTF initialization we randomly 
selected 30% of the documents from each data set as a training 
set. We randomly chose about one third from the initial sample for 
the control set and used the rest as training data and minimized 
variance among the TRS values using cross-validation technique.  
6.1.3 Web Search Engine Query Log 
Our query log has 7 million queries containing 2.4 terms on 
average and 135,000 distinct query terms. Zerber+R considers a 
multi-term query as a sequence of single-term queries.  
Therefore for our experiments we considered each query term 
separately. Figure 10 shows the correlation of the query frequency 
and the corresponding cumulative query workload for retrieving 
top-10 results (computed using Equation 9). 
The log-scale X-axis shows the query terms in decreasing order of 
frequency (from most to least popular). The most frequent queries 
constitute nearly the whole query workload. Thus to reduce the 
total workload cost, the system should provide high efficiency for 
the most frequent queries.  
6.2 Security Guarantees 
If an adversary Alice compromises an index server, she can 
attempt to amplify her knowledge in many ways. For example 
Alice can now examine the unencrypted TRS values attached to 
the posting elements in an index but Zerber+R should ensure 
that she can not learn anything in order to preserve our concept of 
r-confidentiality. To achieve maximal security effectiveness the 
RSTF needs to distribute the relevance scores of each term from 
the real dataset equally well as it is achieved in the training set 
values. Otherwise, term specific distribution patterns would be 
introduced allowing Alice binding posting elements within 
specific posting list areas to their corresponding terms with higher 
probability. In case the document training set is a representative 
sample of the corpus and σ value is selected properly, all terms 
will have equal probability to obtain a given TRS value, such that 
using TRS does not introduce any additional attack possibilities. 
Alice can also observe user queries and query responses. As 
discussed in Section 6.3 it is impractical to include top-k results 
into the initial query response for all possible terms1. Thus for rare 
terms which top-k elements are not contained in the initial 
response Alice could observe an increased number of follow-up 
requests and conclude that a rare term has been requested. 
However, as a Zerber BFM index contains terms of similar 
probability inside of a posting list, the number of requests 
observed by Alice will not differ for the terms contained in one 
merged list, such that r-confidentiality of the index will not be 
affected. Alice could also try to estimate a position of such a rare 
(unknown) term based on the number of returned posting 
elements. Thereby growing response size for follow-up requests 
will reduce the total number of such requests and introduce an 
increasing degree of uncertainty in Alice’s claims regarding the 
position of the (unknown) rare queried term.  
6.3 Storage Overhead 
To allow for top-k processing an ordinary inverted index typically 
contains relevance score information attached to each posting 
element..Zerber+R attaches a transformed relevance score TRS 
to each posting element, which is sufficient for effective posting 
element ranking on the server side. Thus it does not introduce any 
storage overhead compared with an ordinary inverted index.  
6.4 Selection of the Initial Response Size  
As discussed in Section 6.3 Zerber+R increases its response 
size progressively depending on the number of follow-up requests 
to a query. The initial response size should be selected in a way to 
minimize the number of follow-up requests and the bandwidth 
overhead for the majority of the queries in the workload.  
We denote the number of posting elements in the first response as 
initial response size b and the accumulated number of posting 
elements in a sequence containing n follow-up requests as a total 
response size TRes. Given the number of follow-up requests, the 
total response size can be calculated as: 
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Figure 11 presents an average bandwidth overhead AvBO over the 
set of queries Q in the query workload calculated as the ratio 
between the total response size TRes of Zerber+R required in 
                                                                
1 In this paper we focus on a fixed result set size in the initial 
response to a query. However, we leave for further work 
optimizations where this size could vary depending on the 
frequency of the terms of each merged posting list. 
   
Figure 12: Average Number of Requests 
order to obtain the top-k elements and k elements returned by an 
ordinary inverted index in response to a top-k query: 
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The X-axis of Figure 11 shows the number of posting elements in 
the initial query response. The Y-axis shows an average 
bandwidth overhead in both test collections calculated using 
Equation 13 for k=1, 10 and 50.   
Figure 11 shows that the minimal bandwidth overhead for a top-k 
query in Zerber+R can be achieved with b=k, i.e. by returning 
around k elements. Further enlargement of the initial response 
size leads to an increased bandwidth overhead. 
Figure 12 shows an average number of requests required in order 
to obtain the top-k elements dependent on the number of elements 
in the initial response for k=1, 10 and 50 in both test collections. 
The X-axis shows the number of elements in the initial response. 
The Y-axis shows an average number of requests required to 
obtain the top-k elements for the queries in the workload. 
Figure 12 also illustrates that with an initial response size of 
approximately 10 elements most of the query terms return the top-
10 results within 2 requests (returning 30 posting elements in 
total). In order to further reduce the number of requests, the initial 
response size needs to be significantly increased. However this is 
not desirable because of the significant increase in the bandwidth 
overhead. Thus for our further experiments we selected k as the 
preferable initial response size for a top-k query.  
6.5 Query Performance 
We calculated the efficiency in query answering QRatioeff 
introduced by different sizes of the initial response as the ratio 
between k and the total Zerber+R response size: 
Figure 13 plots the efficiency in query answering QRatioeff for the 
top-k request with k=10 and the initial response size b=10, 20 and 
50 elements in the both test collections. In this figure, the Y-axis 
shows QRatioeff and the X-axis represents the query terms in the 
workload (in %), ordered by QRatioeff. 
The best query efficiency distribution for the top-10 request in the 
both test collections is attained using the initial response size 
b=10. In this case around 60% of the longest running queries in 
the workload have an efficiency value QRatioeff=1and the next 
20% longest-running queries have QRatioeff=0.2 on average. The 
shortest running 20% of the queries have average QRatioeff=0.1. 
Increasing the initial response size to 20 elements leads to the 
significant reduction of QRatioeff for all longest running queries. 
In this case around 70% of the longest running queries in the 
workload have an efficiency value QRatioeff=0.5 and the shortest 
running 30% of the queries have average QRatioeff=0.1. 
The simulation results described above have shown that initial 
response size of b=10 offers very reasonable query performance 
for a top-10 query. Our experiments show that using Zerber+R 
the query workload cost ratio can be kept comparable to a 
conventional inverted index for 60% of the queries, while 
preserving the r-confidentiality of the index.  
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Figure 11: Average Bandwidth Overhead 
 
6.6 Network Bandwidth 
An initial response of Zerber+R contains b elements and the 
total response size including follow-up requests required to obtain 
top-k elements is calculated using Equation 12. For our 
calculations, we assume the following intranet setup: users 
connect over a mobile device with a 56 Kb/s modem, while 
servers use 100 Mb/s LAN connections. We use initial response 
size b, k=10. The document snippets arrive in XML format.  
We use a real-world query workload and the Open Directory 
Project (ODP) data described in Section 7.1.2. For our 
experiments we assume that the user has access to all documents 
in the ODP data collection. In this workload, about 85 posting 
elements are returned from the ODP index per query term on 
average. Assuming that each posting element is encoded using 64 
bits, this is approximately 5.3 Kb (0.7 KB) per query term 
response. The queries in the workload contain 2.4 terms on 
average, which allows a server for the execution of about 750 
queries per second. On average, each snippet contains about 250 
B including XML formatting, which yields 2.5 KB for the top-10 
snippets. Thus average total response size for the top-10 results is 
3.5 KB. In comparison, Google’s response for the top-10 results is 
about 15 KB, including the snippets as well as information used 
for presentation purposes (HTML, CSS, etc.). Altavista returns 37 
KB and Yahoo returns 59 KB of top-10 results. As Zerber+R 
posting elements are encrypted, query response is represented by a 
random bit string and standard HTML compression is ineffective. 
The compressed responses of Google, Altavista and Yahoo are 
comparable to Zerber+R responses. Further optimization can be 
achieved by adding search result checksums and caching them on 
the client (defined in HTTP 1.0). 
7. RELATED WORK 
In the literature different ways of protecting outsourced shared 
information were proposed. Encryption is a standard technique for 
storing data confidentially [9],[12]. Ways to search encrypted text 
or tables stored on remote untrusted servers we proposed in [5], 
[7], [10], [19]. [4], [14] provide a framework for policy-based 
protection of XML data. Other techniques include suppressing 
and/or generalizing data into less specific forms, so that they no 
longer uniquely represent individuals [8], [11]; k-anonymity is 
one popular form of generalization (e.g., [3]).  
Unfortunately, encryption of posting elements does not hide 
critical statistical data which can be used by an adversary to 
reverse-engineer the terms [6]. Probabilistic index protection 
techniques suppress statistical data by introducing a controlled 
amount of uncertainty. For instance, the μ-Serv system developed 
by IBM inserts false positive posting elements in the index [2]. 
The lack of precision in search results represents a tradeoff 
between search efficiency and confidentiality preservation. 
Zerber [22] combines the benefits of both probabilistic and 
encryption techniques. It allows obtaining precise search results 
from an outsourced encrypted inverted index while providing 
confidentiality guarantees for the indexed documents. Zerber 
provides tunable resistance to statistical attacks by supplementing 
encryption with a novel probabilistic term merging scheme.  
Unfortunately, solutions discussed above either do not allow for 
top-k retrieval from an outsourced inverted index, or do not 
consider ranking information as sensitive. Zerber+R fills this 
gap by offering a ranking model which allows attaching relevance 
score information to the encrypted posting elements without 
introducing any information leakage from an outsourced index. 
There has been a considerable amount of work on top-k retrieval 
of plain text documents [18]. Thereby an index server makes use 
of the relevance score information attached to each posting 
element to return the top-k documents most relevant to a user 
query. These relevance scores are calculated based on the term 
frequency information as well as on the collection statistics. 
However, term frequency is term specific and thus, if stored in 
plain text, can allow an adversary to discover the terms it belongs 
to. To prevent statistical attacks Zerber+R makes relevance 
scores related to different terms indistinguishable, while 
preserving ordering of posting elements for the top-k processing. 
The idea of uniformly distributing posting elements using an order 
preserving cryptographic function was first discussed in [21]. 
However, uniform distribution of posting elements alone does not 
hide the document frequency and thus allows an adversary to 
recover encrypted terms. Moreover, the order preserving mapping 
function proposed in [21] currently does not support efficient 
index inserts and updates such that, at least in some cases, the 
posting list has to be completely rebuilt. On the contrary, 
Zerber+R is based on an r-confidential inverted index which 
protects document frequency information. Moreover, the RSTF  
of Zerber+R does not introduce any overhead for inserts and 
updates compared with an ordinary inverted index. This function 
is created only once at the index initialization time and allows for 
unlimited index update and insert operations. 
 
Figure 13: Efficiency in Query Answering 
8. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
Privacy-preserving document sharing among collaboration groups 
in an enterprise requires techniques allowing for centralized 
exchange of access-controlled information through largely 
untrusted servers. Such system needs to provide confidentiality 
guarantees for shared information while offering IR properties 
comparable to the ordinary search engines. In this paper we 
presented Zerber+R, a ranking model which allows top-k 
retrieval from a confidential outsourced inverted index. 
Zerber+R creates a relevance score transformation function 
which makes relevance scores of different terms indistinguishable, 
in a way that even if they are known to an adversary they do not 
reveal any information about the indexed data. This enables the 
server to provide the top-k results most relevant to a user query. 
Our experiments on two real-world data sets show that 
Zerber+R makes economical usage of bandwidth and offers 
information retrieval properties comparable with an ordinary 
inverted index while preserving the confidentiality of the indexed 
data.  
Zerber+R allows for r-confidential server-side top-k retrieval as 
well as insert in presence of adversary. RSTF proposed in this 
work is monotonic, such that it does not affect accuracy of the 
single-term top-k query. However, as score calculation does not 
include IDF factor, accuracy of multi-term queries can be slightly 
affected. This effect was considered in the literature [21].      
In this paper multi-term queries are viewed as a sequence of 
single-term queries. Confidential ranking of the multi-term 
queries is an interesting direction for future research. 
Another interesting direction is the investigation of how the 
quality of the learned training data influences the security of the 
system. 
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